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1 Setting the scene
Small states and international security
Anders Wivel, Alyson J.K Bailes and Clive Archer,
Introduction
Small states have traditionally played a marginal role in the construction and
maintenance of international security orders. Accepting the dictum formulated
by Thucydides in the fifth century BC, that 'the strong do what they have the
power to do and the weak accept what they have to accept' (Thucydides [1954)
1972: 302), small states have tended to pursue pragmatic and reactive security
policies adapting to the interests of nearby great powers and aiming primarily to
ensure their own survival. As noted by Browning:
[i)n the international relations literature and in world politics size has gener-
ally been connected to capability and influence. Whilst being big is corre-
lated with power, being small has been viewed as a handicap to state action,
and even state survival. .
(Browning 2006: 669)
This was true even as international affairs began to institutionalize. In the nine-
teenth century, the Congress of Vienna recognized the special role of the United
Kingdom, Prussia, Austria, France and Russia, and for almost a century the great
powers set the rules of the game by meeting 'in concert on a regular basis in order
to discuss questions of concern, and to draw up agreements and treaties' (Neumann
and Gswhl 2006: 5). Small states were those states that were not great powers, I.e.
the states left to obey the rules of the game, because they were too weak to be
taken seriously when the rules were negotiated. In the first half of the twentieth
century, conditions seemed to worsen for small states as the development of new
weapons teclmology widened the gap between them and the great powers. As
noted by Annette Baker Fox in her classic study of the power of small states:
[d]uring World War 11it was widely asserted that the day of the small power
was over. Not only could such a state have no security under modern con-
ditions of war; it could have no future in the peace that presumably one day
would follow.
. (Fox 2006 [) 9591: 39)
4 A. Wivelet al.
Superpower rivalry between the US and the Soviet Union following the end
of the war simultaneously intensified and ameliorated the security predica-
ment of small states. On the one hand, the institutions of international society
were strengthened. On a global scale, the establishment and subsequent devel-
opment of the United Nations served as an important vehicle for decoloniza-
tion (supported by both superpowers), which helped to create a large number
of new small states. Subsequently the UN served as a platform for small states
voicing their concerns over international developments and cooperating on
promoting their values and interests. On a regional scale, a proliferation of
new regional trade agreements and organizations, most notably the precursors
to the European Union, helped small states to achieve some of the economies
of scale that had traditionally been the privilege of great powers. On the other
hand, a world with two superpowers of continental size and global reach was
also a world of even greater power disparity than had been the case before the
war, with a sharp delineation between the security- (and insecurity- )produc-
ing superpowers and small state security consumers unable to defend their
own territory against external (and sometimes internal) threats.
A transformed geopolitical environment after the Cold War, 9/11 and the
Iraq war have fundamentally altered the security challenges of small states in
Europe. Most importantly, the end of the Cold War reduced the traditional
military threat to most European small states significantly. In much of Europe
- at least - small states need not fear military invasion for the foreseeable
future. This has widened the foreign policy room of manoeuvre considerably
for these small states, as they need no longer fear that policies provoking or
irritating the strong will lead to military subjugation or extinction. In addi-
tion, from the 1990s onwards, intensified globalization and increased interde-
pendence reduced the importance of traditional military instruments in a way
that highlighted both the diplomatic and institutional competencies of small
states, and their possible non-state (business, intellectual, environmental)
assets.
However, new security challenges soon emerged. The Gulf War of
1990-1991 and the struggle over former Yugoslavia created new demands for
active conflict management, and small states were expected to contribute to their
solution even if their immediate security interests were not under threat. The
repercussions of the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington on
September II, 2001, and the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, emphasized the
global aspect of small state security. As the European experience has illustrated,
this does not necessarily mean the end of great power politics. The gradual
development of the EU as a security actor, and the frequent use of informal big
member state consultations in EU security policy making, illustrates that Euro-
peanization entails challenges as well as opportunities (Wivel 2005). At the same
time economic, societal and environmental security issues present all states with
a new set of challenges including financial crisis, increased competition over
markets. mieration. terrorism and global warming.
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The aim ofthe book
The aim of this book is to conceptualize, map and explain the security challenges
of small states today. We specifically aim both to identify the challenges and the
opportunities of small states and to discuss the costs and benefits of the different
security strategies followed by small states inside and outside Europe. Through-
out the history of international security, small states' relative lack of power has
given them less influence over international events and a smaller margin of time
and error (Jervis 1978: 172-173). As permanent security consumers they have
had little to offer the great powers and therefore, also, a limited room for man-
oeuvre when pursuing strategic goals beyond security and survival. As the stra-
tegic environment of small states is changing, so are their opportunities and
incentives to engage actively in the creation and maintenance of security orders.
Even though the literature on small state security has been growing rapidly
since the end of the Cold War, there have been few attempts to go beyond single
country studies and provide a comprehensive overview of the general pattem of
challenges, opportunities and strategies facing small states in the current security
order. Now, as in the past, the study of small states is plagued by a lack of cumu-
lative insights and coherent debate. This book aspires to fill this void by taking
three steps towards a more generally applicable understanding of small state
security. First, we discuss how the transformation of small state security necessi-
tates the development and application of new security concepts, and extends the
range of possible solutions. Second, we analyse a number of European cases in
order to describe and explain the security predicament of small European states
today and how they respond. Third, we explore examples of small state security
in Africa, Asia and the Caribbean to see how they compare or contrast with the
European experience. All this helps to produce comparative insights, drawn from
the conceptual discussions and empirical analyses, and reflected in the chapters
of Part III.
We do not seek to prove a certain theoretical school - realist, liberal or con-
structivist - right or wrong. Our research strategy is to start from a shared defini-
tion of small states, to focus on the security challenges and opportunities of
small states today and in the recent past, and to structure the analyses within
each part of the book with a set of questions to be answered by each chapter
within that part. Thus, our aim is not to construct and test a grand theory of small
states, but to offer a structured and focused analysis ofsmall state security today.
We also acknowledge that different theories may shed light in different places,
and that variations in historical, geopolitical and institutional contexts will affect
the applicability of general theories to small state security over time and space.
Defining small states in international security
Students have not reached a consensus on how to define a small state or which
behavioural characteristics may be seen as typical for small states, beyond the
general tendency of such states to adapt to - rather than dominate - their external
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environment, and (where applicable) to seek influence through membership of
international institutions (Amstrup 1976: 178; Antola and Lehtimllki 2001:
13-20; Archer and Nugent 2002: 2-5; Christmas-Meller 1983: 40; Hey 2003:
2-10; Knudsen 2002: 182-185; Panke 2010: 15; Steinmetz and Wivel 2010:
4-7).' Thus, although most students would agree with Hey, that today '(sJmall
states (... J enjoy more international prestige and visibility than at any other time
in history' (Hey 2003: I), they would find it hard to agree upon what exactly
constitutes a small state.
Despite this lack of consensus, analyses of small state security tend to focus
on material power capabilities, i.e. the possession of - or rather the lack of -
power resources in absolute or relative terms; most often measured by proxies
such as population size, GDP (gross domestic product) or military expenditure.
Historically, this type of definition follows directly from the development of
international society in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries when the number
of small states rose sharply as a consequence of the break-up of empires and
decolonization, The class of small states was a 'residual category', referring to
those states that were not great powers and thus were defined by 'their presumed
lack of power in a quantitative sense' (Neumann and Gstilhl 2006: 4). Theoret-
ically, this type of definition typically follows from a starting point in the realist
school of international relations, which has historically been the dominant
approach to the analysis of international security, including the security prob-
lems of small states.'
Three benefits follow from defining small states in terms of capabilities. First,
if we are to analyse the opportunities, challenges and limitations of a specific
state, indications of absolute and relative capacity are important, because they
inform us of the absolute and relative limitations on these states' capacity to
handle different types of challenges. Second, an absolute and universal threshold
between big and small states of, for example, a population size of 15 million
people, or a GDP of €500 billion, has the benefit of creating a clear and easily
applicable definition of small states. The same can be said of a relative definition
defining great powers as the 'top ten' in the world, or the 'top five' in a specific
region - measured in, for example, population size, GDP or military expenditure
- and the rest as small states. Also, the existing power indexes of the (realist) IR
literature, which seeks to combine a number of parameters in order to evaluate
the aggregate power of states, may be adapted to the analysis of small states
(Kennedy 1987; Schweller 1998; Wohlforth 1999).
Third, starting from a power possession definition allows us to draw on the
comprehensive literature on power and security in international relations in order
to identify why, when and how the security challenges of small states are distinct
from those faced by stronger states. For instance, Kenneth Waltz, the pre-
eminent scholar of relative capabilities, discusses the implications of power (and
the lack of it) and notes that: (1) 'power provides the means of maintaining one's
autonomy in the face of force that others wield', (2) 'greater power permits
wider ranges of action, while leaving the outcome of action uncertain', (3) 'the
more powerful enjoy wider margins of safety in dealing with the less powerful
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and have more to say about which games will be played and how', and finally
(4) 'great power gives its possessors a big stake in their system and the ability to
act for its sake' (Waltz 1979: 194-195). Following this discussion, it could be
argued that small states: (1) are not able by themselves to preserve their own
autonomy in the face of force that others wield; (2) have a narrow range of
action; (3) have little to say about which games are being played, and how; (4)
have only a small stake in the system and are unable to act for its sake. These
four points correspond closely with a traditionalist view of small states in inter-
national security. Throughout the book, the authors of individual chapters use
these four assumptions as a starting point for discussing to which extent this
view is still relevant for the states analysed.
Vet despite the merits of the power possession definition of small states and
its prominence in security studies, we find that it has at least three important lim-
itations. First, it leads us to a focus on the military dimension of security. A
focus on material power resources naturally leads to a focus on military security,
because military capabilities are decisive for state survival in conventional
warfare. Even when human and economic resources are included in the defini-
tion of material power, these tend to be regarded as components of 'latent power'
necessary for upholding and developing the military power capabilities that are
vital for survival in an anarchic international system (e.g. Mearsheimer 2001).
To be sure, military security threats continue to be important to the large major-
ity of small states, but, as argued in Chapter 2, an exclusive focus on military
threats is too restrictive if we are to understand small state security today. Most
importantly, we risk underestimating the opportunities and contributions of small
states if we focus on material, and in effect military, capabiiities, because con-
ventional military power is the area where most small states are weakest.
Second, as argued by Rothstein, a focus on quantifiable objective criteria
logically leads to a ranking of powers and an understanding of international rela-
tions in terms of power hierarchy, which is of little use for identifying the real
challenges and opportunities of small states (Rothstein 1968). There are two
problems with this understanding in regard to analysing small state security.
First, security challenges to small states are rarely systemic but typically
originate in the geopolitical vicinity of the small state. Second, we cannot deduce
a state's security challenges from its power rank in the international system, or
even in a given region. Security conflicts are typically the product of power as
well as a number of other factors, such as historical lessons learned by the polit-
ical elites and the electorate, religion, ideology, the personality of decision-
makers and political institutions. Thus, challenges to small state security often
make most sense within a specific spatio-temporal context, now including their
specific role in, and adjustment to, globalized features of the world scene. It
follows that no matter whether we focus on absolute or relative power, the cri-
teria for defining the cut-off line between small states and great powers will
always be arbitrary, and this problem is only aggravated if we introduce addi-
tional categories such as middle powers and micro-states.' There is no reason
why a country with 20 million people should be a great power and a country
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with 18 million should be a small state, or why number five in Europe - meas-
ured in military expenditure - should be characterized as a great power and
number six should not. Would numbers one to five face a different set of shared
problems than numbers six and seven? Would they follow a shared strategy dis-
tinguishable from that followed by numbers six and seven to solve these prob-
lems? So far, the evidence clearly suggests that they would not.
Finally, the power possession definition is based on the premise that we can
quantify and measure power. However, power is difficult to measure and its
effects are ahuost impossible to distinguish from the calculations and percep-
tions of policy makers. Thus, the cut-off point between big and small states is
rarely self-evident, and, accordingly, there is no consensus on what constitutes a
small state in term of power possession. Indeed, the notion 'small state' has
typically been used to denote at least three different types of states: micro-states,
small states in the developed world and small states in the Third World (Hey
2003: 2). Adding to the confusion, none of these categories is clear-cut and there
is agreement on how to define them. Micro-states are sometimes defined accord-
ing to the size of their population, typically with the threshold set somewhere
between 100,000 and 1.5 million inhabitants (cf. Anckar 2004: 208; Mohamed
2002: 1; Neumann and GstOhl 2006: 6; Plischke 1977: 21), but at other times
micro-states are defined by having 'a size so diminutive as to invite comment'
(Warrington 1998: 102). Likewise, small states in the developed world have
been defined using a number of different and often incompatible criteria, leading
to confusion over how to recognize a small state when we see one.
Thus Vliyrynen, in a survey on the concept, identifies two axes for defining
small states (Vliyrynen 1971). One axis focuses on whether the defining criteria
for small states are objective, e.g. size of GDP or population, or subjective, e.g.
perceptions of domestic or foreign elites. The other axis focuses on whether the
defining criteria are endogenous, i.e. internal characteristics of a country, or
exogenous, Le. the country's relations with other states' Adding to the complex-
ity, small states in the Third World usually have much larger populations than
what we term small states in the developed world, because 'population size is
taken as a proxy of a range of other economic characteristics - all of which are
deemed to bestow particular vulnerabilities on small states' (Heron 2008: 246).
Thus, in his now classical study The Inequality of States, David Vital studies
small states with, ' ... a) a population of 10--15 million in the case of economic-
ally advanced countries and b) a population of 20--30 million in the case of
underdeveloped countries' (Vital 1967: 8).
Acknowledging this limitation, as well as the difficulties of measuring power
and its consequences, we have proposed to the authors in this book a move away
from the quantifiable power possession definition of small states to one that is
qualitative and relational (cf. Mouritzen and Wive12005b; Rothstein 1968; Toje
2010). We thereby accept the argument recently made by several scholars that,
rather than continue the search for universal characteristics of small states and
their behaviour, the 'small state' concept is best used as a 'focusing device' for
highlighting the characteristic security problems and foreign policy dilemmas of
,
I Small states and international security 9the weaker actors in asymmetric power relationships (Mouritzen and Wivel2005b; Thomallsson and Wive12006; Rickli 2008; WiveI2005).'
Accordingly, we define a small state as the weaker part in an asymmetric rela-
tionship, which is unable to change the nature or functioning of the relationship
on its own (cf. Mouritzen and Wive12005a: 4; Gran and Wive12011; Steinmetz
and Wivel 2010). Following this definition, small states 'are stuck with the
power configuration and its institutional expression, no matter what their specific
relation to it is' (Mouritzen and Wivel 2005a: 4). For instance, if the United
States chose to remove its troops from the European continent or to leave
NATO, or if China chose to abandon the Security Cooperation Organization
(SCO), this would radically change these institutions and therefore the nature,
magnitude and intensity of the security challenges for all other member states.
But if Denmark left NATO or Tajikistan left the SCO, the consequences would
mainly be felt by these small states themselves. Therefore, such states cannot
credibly threaten to leave, alter or destroy institutional structures: one important
way in which their strategic challenges and options differ from those of great
powers. However, today, a small state typically acts simultaneously in a number
of different power configurations with different sets of actors, and therefore a
state may be weak ('small') in one relation, but simultaneously powerful (a
'great power') in another. For instance, Romania is a great power in its relations
with Moldova but a small state in its relations with Russia, and Denmark is a
small state in NATO but a great power in relation to the Baltic countries. Thus,
we argue that being a small state is tied to a specific spatio-temporal context and
that this context - rather than general characteristics of the state defined by indi-
cators such as its absolute population size or its military expenditure relative to
other states - is decisive for both the nature of challenges and opportunities, and
the small states' answer to these challenges and opportunities. ,
This definition shifts the analytical focus from the power that states possess to
the power that they exercise. From this point of departure the authors of this
book use the concept ofsmall states as a 'focusing device', directing us towards
interesting research puzzles stemming from 'the experience of power disparity
and the manner of coping with it' (Knudsen 1996: 5; cf. Gartner, 1993: 303;
Rickli 2008; Thorhallsson and Wivel 2006; Wivel 2005: 395). Thus, '[s)mall-
ness is, in this conception, a comparative and not an absolute idea' (Hanf and
Soetendorp 1998: 4). It brings to our attention a particular set of security prob-
lems and foreign policy dilemmas, allowing us - among other things - to distin-
guish between issue areas where the notion of small state is relevant, and issue
areas where it is not.
Contents of the book and chapter summaries
This shared approach to the definition of small states helps to ensure the
analytical coherence of the book. Further, the chapters share a common time
frame. All chapters focus on the present and on the recent past (since the end of
the Cold War), although authors include references to the more distant past
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whenever it is relevant for understanding the challenges, opportunities and pol-
itics of the present. Finally and crucially, coherence and comparability within
each section of the book is ensured by a single set of questions that all chapter
authors were asked to consider, as set out below.
Small state security revisited: history, concepts, theory
The book is organized into three parts. The first part, 'Small state security revis-
ited: history, concepts, theory', provides the conceptual and analytical frame-
work for the volume. This introductory chapter and the next chapter (which
discusses the security of small states) establish the general framework and shared
premises of the book. The three following chapters discuss new functional
approaches going beyond traditional, military notions of security: economic
security, societal security and environmental security. The authors of these three
chapters have sought to answer the following questions: (I) How do you define
this particular dimension of security? (2) Why is it important for small states?
(3) How has the understanding and impact of this dimension of security changed
over time for small states? and (4) What lessons and apparently useful tools for
small states' internal and external governance have emerged?
In Chapter 2, Alyson Bailes, Jean-Marc Rickli and Baldur Thorhallsson
explain the practical and theoretical developments that have led to wider and
more diverse security concepts entering the realm of public policy since the late
twentieth century. More fields of life, such as economic management, energy
supply or health, have been brought within the scope of security or have been
recognized as including security dimensions. Security processes are understood
to operate not only between states, but also at trans-state and sub-state levels and
they increasingly involve non-state actors - businesses, terrorists, media or the
ordinary citizen - as agents, as well as objects or victims. A wider variety of
international organizations than before have competence to address at least some
part of the security spectrum, and security governance within the state is attract-
ing new attention as the importance of managing it both efficiently and in accord
with human rights and democratic norms is realized. The subjective nature of
many perceptions in the security field has further been acknowledged by the
concept of 'securitization', which asks who first defines a given issue as a
security challenge, and by what means public assent is acquired to tackle it with
suitably robust methods.
As a starting-point for considering how this affects small states, the authors
propose a four-line table of potential threats and risks, covering, respectively:
traditional military problems, non-state human threats, economic and social vul-
nerabilities and accidental and natural hazards. While each small state will have
a specific mix of such concerns - both objectively, and in terms of what is 'secu-
ritized' - some general assumptions can be made, starting with the permanent
disadvantages of a small administration facing traditional military threats at
home or abroad. For the other three categories of risks, small states' limited
resources expose them to deeper damage from a single event, but their small
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scale may also make it easier to comprehend and solve some problems. At
bottom, a small polity must choose between a passive and neutralist orientation
in international society, or an active one. The latter choice is becoming more
typical as non-military threats can rarely be solved by inaction, and the peace-
keeping vogue calls for small states to contribute to global goods evep in the
military mode. The widening of agendas also means that a single large-state pro-
tector is unlikely to be able to resolve all its protege's problems, so that the role
of the institution os shelter is becoming more central to small state strategies at
least in regions (and there are several) where this option exists. Multilateral
organizations, whose governance is reasonably pluralistic, can even offer a kind
of 'escape from smallness' by giving small states a theoretically equal say in
framing collective security policies. Though big-small dynamics still work to
their disadvantage within the structure, some small players - such as the Nordic
countries - have managed to edge whole institutional communities towards
giving, at least, lip-service to norms - such as peaceful resolution of disputes
and concern for the global commons - that are bound to profit the small. The
question is how much a small state opting for institutional integration has to
'pay' in return for such benefits, and whether the bargain may even be more
subtly erosive of the weaker party's identity than traditional power relationships
have been - on which more below.
Chapter 3, by Richard Griffiths, deals with the economic and financial aspects
of the strategic plight of small states: an issue on which the literature, as noted,
has swung from pessimism to optimism and back since the beginning of the
twentieth century. He argues that (relative) economic success or vulnerability
can only be addressed today in a context of open international trade and interde-
pendence: it is not just about basic provision for one's citizens, but about the
ability to survive the shocks that a volatile global system brings. In this context,
above all, a numerical measure of ~smallness' can tell us little, since a rich,
developed state will have different challenges, and solutions at its disposal, from
a poor developing one with the same size of population. In fact, the various
indices developed to try to measure vulnerability regularly show a preponder-
ance of small states in the most vulnerable class, but also position some nations,
like Luxembourg, Switzerland and the Netherlands, in the least vulnerable
group. In particular small, developed states have often been judged favourably in
terms of adaptability and resilience. As in other fields of security, what seems to
matter is less the common weaknesses of the small and more, the effectiveness
of different strategies used to counter them. The high import needs and limited
export potential of small economies can, for instance, be cushioned from the
worst shocks within a structure of long-term economic commitments and
common rules such those provided by regional organizations. While fiscal levers
may be less effective, volatile commodity prices could be eyened out by creating
a national stabilization fund. Other aspects of internal\'rganization may, in the
end, be even more crucial: social cohesion, a 'corporatist,':system based on com-
promise among economic partners, and general good goV~manceto avoid - inter
alia - waste through corruption. Such factors mav explain the intri2uin2 findin2
12 A. Wivel et al.
that small independent states often weather crises better than neighbouring sub-
state regions of similar size and wealth. They are solutions available, in prin-
ciple, to the poorest of small states as well as the richest.
Chapter 4, by Alyson Bailes, returns to the issue of today's wide, multi-
functional definitions of security and asks how a small state with limited finan-
cial and human resources can cope with such a potentially confusing agenda. A
solution adopted by most Nordic states (under one name or another) is the
concept of 'societal security', which views a functioning, peaceful society in
itself - distinct from the level of the state, or the isolated individual - as a
security good and a resource for security building. In practice, in these countries,
societal security policies have become focused on the handling of non-warlike
emergencies and on the best ways to bring state and non-state actors, including
the private sector and citizens' volunteer groups, together for the purpose. This
focus on the event, rather than on creeping and dispersed risk factors such as
social or environmental change, may in itself be disputed; but the societal
security approach does have some prima facie generic advantages for small
states. Among other things, the recognition and prioritization of a wide range of
risks - from terrorist action to natural disasters - gives room for compromise
among different schools of thought and their securitizations, including those
who reject a military focus. Non-state actors in small nations may also have
strengths, including an understanding of the globalized environment, that the
state authorities lack. Nevertheless the societal vision has its own weaknesses,
starting with the question of how to define 'society' itself - rarely monolithic in
modem conditions, and not necessarily coinciding with state boundaries. Bailes
concludes that the use of a specific name or concept is immaterial, but small
states in any region might improve their security strategies and implementing
structures by asking themselves the same questions as those raised by the 'soci-
etal' agenda.
Chapter 5, by Auaur Ing6lfsd6ttir, addresses one of the 'softest', if not genu-
inely the newest, sections of the modem security spectrum: the concern for
environmental security, currently deepened by an awareness of the multiple, and
probably severe, impacts of climate change. She explains that environmental
security itself can be addressed either in a more traditional light, focusing on the
links between environment and conflict dynamics, or in a broader context of
'human security' - a concept introduced in Chapter 2 - where implications for
health, the economy and other personal circumstances would be considered as
equally important. As with other non-military hazards, local environmental risks
can sometimes be easier for a small polity to handle, especially when well-
resourced, and climate change is putting states of all sizes in jeopardy. A small
state is, however, much less likely to be able directly to mitigate the process,
given its low carbon emissions, and it may have little room to adapt if - like
some small island states - the next decades could see its whole territory sub-
merged. In fact, these latter states have grouped together to achieve international
r~cognition of their plight: offering a further example of how multilateral, insti-
tutionalized aooroaches to common security oroblems may allow small actors to
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influence emerging norms even among far more powerful actors. Taking the
Nordic states as a test-case, Ing61fsd6ttir suggests that the requisites of success
in such a tactic are a record of international activism and expertise. of setting a
good example by domestic action and of the coincidence of negotiating positions
with real national interests. If this conclusion helps to underline the importance
of national security governance as addressed in Chapter 2, Ing6lfsd6ttir also
stresses that small states do not necessarily get the equation right: even the
Nordic countries have sometimes bartered environmental norms for short-term
economic advantages or sectoral interests.
Small state security in Europe
The second part, 'Small State Security in Europe', covers illustrative groups of
small states aiJd micro-states in the wider setting of Europe, moving from some
examples that have been extensively analysed in a 'small states' framework to
others that have not yet been addressed in this perspective, or are under-studied
in general. Each chapter addresses these four questions: (l) Why is/are this par-
ticular state/these particular states relevant/interesting? (2) What are the most
important security challenges faced by the state/s in question and how do the
challenges relate to their 'smallness'? (3) What are the most important character-
istics of this state's/these states' security policy? (4) Does the analysis yield
important insights and/or lead to important policy advice for other states?
A general observation regarding Europe's smaller states is that, with a few
exceptions (notably Luxembourg), they tend to be spread around the peripheries
of the continent and are more often strategically exposed than sheltered. The fact
that they have, in modem times, a rather good record of survival - and in many
cases also of wealth and wellbeing - says something about the range of solutions
that this macro-region offers for giving them shelter, ranging from national part-
nerships to the world's most sophisticated and strong multilateral security organ-
izations. This set of states thus provides the obvious first place to look for the
benefits, costs and other implications of post-modem solutions to relational
asymmetry that go beyond traditional bandwaggonirtg and/or subjection.
The five Nordic states that are introduced in Chapter 6, by Clive Archer, are a
diverse group in every way: from their size (Iceland's population numbering
one-third ofa million and Sweden's population approaching ten million) to their
formal strategic orientation (three being members ofNA TO and two being milit-
arily non-allied). The chapter rightly stresses these variations, as they make even
more interesting the question: Why has the Nordic region remained so stable
since 1945 while producing such a positive 'surplus' of high-minded inter-
national activism? The fact that the countries have no tensions, or damaging
competition, among themselves may be just as fundamental a part of the answer
as the de facto US strategic umbrella that, for now, remains in place over the
whole sub-region. Given these two basic features, the fact that the Nordics have
evaded a local defence pact among themselves and relied rather on NATO/EU
coverage to manage their asymmetrical position vis-a-vis Russia has actually
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served the interests of stability and global freedom of action for all concerned in
the North. For dealing with modern, trans-frontier security problems, however,
and for ensuring that the norms promoted by such small players do in fact impact
on world governance, the non-legalistic and practical web of intra-Nordic
security cooperation is also very important - and is now growing in scope and
significance.
The Baltic States provide both parallels and contrasts with their Nordic neigh-
bours, and both aspects are well brought out in Chapter 7, by Mind~ugas Jurky-
nas. Not only are Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania closer to RUSSIa and thus
exposed to one of Europe's most blatant strategic asymmetries, but, having been
more than once engulfed by Russian/Soviet power, their very identity includes
an apparently indelible anti-Russian streak. Consequently, 'hard' security con-
cerns have pushed them into a shared strategy of outright, maximal integration
with both the EU and NATO, combined with efforts to earn protection from the
US. They have also profited from several tiers of neighbourhood cooperation,
including many kinds of Nordic help, short of actual guarantees. Their particular
paradox is that while playing the post-modern integration game to th~ hilt, th~y
have remained stubbornly modern in the zero-sum aspects of therr strategic
outlook. Even these states' newer, non-military security challenges are still
largely seen through a Russia-related (energy, cyber-safety) or an identity-related
(migration, minorities) lens. Tellingly, also, in all three nations the level of con-
sensus experienced and the bureaucratic solutions used for 'hard' and 'soft'
security issues, respectively, are quite different.
With the Western Balkan states covered in Chapter 8, by Vgnja Samardtija
and Senada Selo Sabic, even more dramatic security challenges come into the
picture. In the last two decades this region has witnessed bloody conflict among
states and entities qualifying as 'small', and their deconstruction into even
smaller entities (most recently, Kosovo and Montenegro). Today, peace is meas-
urably being consolidated - with the help of still-present international missions
_ but serious challenges remain in non-military security, democracy, and the
general quality of governance. NATO and EU integration comes into play here,
not only as a way of building immunity against mutual and external attack, but
also as a force for transforming identity through conditional reforms receiving
targeted assistance. Cooperation and synergy among the region's actors and their
medium-sized neighbours are also promoted in the process. The over-arching
question about the success of this strategy is the credibility of the 'carrot' ofEUI
NATO membership if timetables become too extended. As our authors pornt out,
however, Croatia's recent successful entry into the ED, and its presence with
Albania in NATO, have provided both encouragement to the others and a prac-
tical local model. Manifold as these nations' problems may be, their smallness at
this point in history is perhaps more helpful than not: providing flexibility for
development, and the hope of - eventually - easy assimilation into the conti-
nent's powerful institutions.
The cases of Moldova and Georgia, placed in the Western fringe of the
Fonner Soviet Union. can make the Western Balkans' position look almost
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fortunate. Both have seen parts of their territory fall under the de facto control of
Moscow and its friends; in Georgia's case after an open, armed conflict in 2008.
Both are prone to transnational ills that damage both themselves and their neigh-
bours, and both have, at best, imperfect democracies and security systems. For
these two states, however, smallness as such, and the preservation of identity are
arguably not the key issues. Facing a strategic situation where the West cannot
do much to help them and may even be half-hearted over their inclusion, they
need to make fundamental national choices about what kind of shelter they can
realistically seek and what price they will pay for it. Even more than the former
Yugoslav states, they might need fundamental changes in their politics and
world outlook to be able both to achieve and accept organized Europe's post-
modern solutions. For the present, at least, there are more signs of possible
acceptance of this bargain in Moldova's cautious, defensive, drive towards the
EU than in Georgia's more assertive tactics.
Micro-states are a sub-set of the world's smallest states that share some basic
challenges and that have often found idiosyncratic solutions. Applying a cri.
terion of representation at the UN plus a population below one million, Archie
Simpson identifies 44 such states in the world and ten in Europe. Ranging from
Iceland to Montenegro and from Luxembourg to Malta by way of the Holy See,
the latler are very diverse in location, wealth and security predicaments. Most do
not maintain armed forces and are protected by a large neighbour, plus - in two
cases - NATO. Cyprus suffers, however, from a tense internal division and hosts
a UN peacekeeping mission. Micro-state economies have even more funda.
mental limitations, and in Europe have most often solved them by some combi.
nation of dependence on neighbours, sharing of currencies (now often the euro),
and joining of collective institutions like the EU. Several have also explored
profitable branches that are not size-dependent, such as casinos, banking services
and tax havens. As discussed further in the third part of this book, this is a post-
modern solution par excellence but also one that exposes small communities to
transnational crime, abuse, and serious reputational risk. Simpson correctly
stresses, therefore, the importance of good governance and points out that even
among European states in this class, it is not automatically forthcoming.
Comparative insights: beyond Europe
The third part, 'Comparative Insights', expands the book's purview and seeks to
reveal parallels and contrasts by applying a similar analytical approach to three
regions outside Europe that contain a significant number of small states. The
regions are chosen because of their variety and because they have well.
developed traditions of scholarship on security, or small states, or both. Here, the
authors addressed the following key questions: (1) Why is this region and its
smaller states relevant/interesting? (2) What are the most important security
challenges faced by the state/s in question and how do the challenges relate to
its/their 'smallness'? (3) What are the most important characteristics of this
state's/these states' security policy/policies? (4) Does the analvsis vielrl
.m~= ..",,~-cs .aco::.(X ~ 10 important policy advice for other states? The
~, -a- re::~ integration in each relevant region is taken into account;
",,-t:.»: ~ fuuJ c:hap£cr add.resses some generic issues about small polities world.
••i.:le~ar~ the light they shed on an international system in rapid evolution.
In Chapter II, by Ian Taylor, the first case-study takes Botswana as an
example of a small developmental state in Africa and focuses on the prima/acie
riddle of its success. Together with a few others in its region, such as Mauritius,
it has attained soaring growth rates only exceeded by the 'small tigers' of Asia.
To understand the reasons for this growth, it is necessary to explore the typical
economic security challenges of a poorer, ex-colonial state; and what Botswana
seems to show is that the world community's orthodox notions of promoting
development by reducing state power may be wrong-headed. Admittedly well
placed in other dimensions of security, Botswana has succeeded through its
efforts to keep control of its own strategic resources (diamonds) and to deploy
the proceeds through a strong government and a strong, competent bureaucracy
for interventionist development planning. In the process, the country has avoided
many of the pitfalls indicated by the analysis of small state vulnerabilities (cf.
Chapter 5). Botswana's development trajectory has not been unproblematic: the
country still has immense levels of inequality and poverty. However, elements
within Botswana's post-independence history could be useful for other poorer
small states to take on board, not just in Botswana's African neighbourhood, but
elsewhere as well.
In Chapter 12, Alan Chong begins by analysing general traditions of state-
hood in Asia and shows that, historically, merit and authority depended on
factors quite unrelated to size. The present self-conceptions and threat percep-
tions of Asian small states reflect the way these longer traditions have been over-
laid by colonial influences - including the creation of new ethnic mixes as well
as boundaries - and the Manichaean culture of the Cold War. The contrasting
case-studies of Singapore and Sri Lanka both show how, as a result, external
worries driven by asymmetrical relationships are compounded by fears of
internal dissent, in what the author calls an 'intermestic' mix. For Sri Lanka, the
overriding internal issue is that of the conflict between the Sinhalese and the
Tamils, which not only prompted the recent bloody civil war, but has since
driven government attempts to balance with other large actors, such as China,
against the presumptively pro- Tamil Indian power. Singapore, for its part, had a
long struggle even to establish its permanent statehood vis-a-vis Malaysia and to
secure its territory against the even larger neighbour, Indonesia. Its rulers have
sought to suppress risks from internal ethnic diversity by a policy of strong gov-
ernment, underpinned by would-be distinct Singaporean values, and a corporatist
approach to working with non-state sectors. The price is a certain 'strategic para-
noia' that demands constant vigilance and effort - like pedalling to stay on a
bicycle. Externally, Singapore's initial Cold War dependence on the US has
shifted towards an effort for multi-polar balance that includes acceptable forms
of engagement with China. Singaporean concerns about conflict risks and non-
military security are much eased by belonging to ASEAN, as well as to other
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competent multilateral groups. Chong concludes that intermestic issues of
identity-forming, including the question of who belongs as a citizen or 'who
goes and who stays', are typical of today's security agendas and attempted solu-
tions by the region's small states. The external framework in which such states
operate, however, starts with their sometimes 'accidental construction' during
the colonial period and remains strongly shaped and limited by the greater
powers.
Chapter 13, by Timothy Shaw, deals with the small island states of the Carib-
bean region: a collection of former (and some still present) colonies that have
evaded the world's largest wars but are among those most heavily exposed to
non-military security hazards. His analysis dwells on, and richly illustrates, the
post-modem trends for which this region provides a prime laboratory. Regional
and trans-regional networking, the dynamics of human crime and violence, the
threat of climate change and the best-attuned governance responses, based on
transnational networking and regulation - all operate just as much, and are
equally decisive for good or bad security at the non-state as well as the tradi-
tional state level. Diasporas and 'transnational families', to give just one
example, provide crucial flows of remittances but also 'export' Caribbean-style
violence to other regions and facilitate the multi-billion dollar drugs trade. The
concept of 'citizen security', an interesting counterpoint to the Nordic 'societal
security' introduced in Chapter 4, has grown up to define the positive solutions
for which local and global, state and non-state actors can and should collaborate.
In terms of wealth, development and resilience, the Caribbean region (however
defined) is very diverse and will no doubt remain so. Clearly, for all its small
states, transnational threat factors and transnational solutions will determine
future fortunes as much as, and often more than, any traditional security
calculus.
In Chapter 14, Godfrey Baldacchino reverts to the generic theme of small ter-
ritories worldwide that are endowed with statehood while lacking some or all of
its traditional power characteristics. These face the starkest version of asym-
metry, both in their regional and global relations; yet, as th,e author shows with
rich examples drawn from all non-European regions, it is not impossible for
David to survive the contest with Goliath. The variety and intensity of their
experience is best understood if the nature of statehood can be re-framed in
Foucault's terms as 'the smart deployment of actual and potentially available
capacities to secure desirable fiscal, human, material, legal or geopolitical
resources'. In an interconnected world, a small actor can sometimes extend a
long way by such means, and can explore many niches that only make sense in
terms of relations with larger counterparts such as 'offshore' services. However,
intrinsic handicaps of smallness include the existential impact of quite small
natural, economic and other events; the lack of a hinterland and of diversity,
whereby a setback in one key sector may impose a total switch of profi Ie or the
large-scale export of population; and the ease of 'capture' by commercial, crimi-
nal or other external interests. Baldacchino concludes that any really small polity
will go through a crisis sometime. the only Question being when and of what
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kind. Vet most such states, even when recently created, do survive; and the 'cre-
ative political economy' used by those who manage to prosper could offer
lessons even to larger players on how to cope with the globalized age. If this
finding echoes Griffiths' remarks on small states' economic adaptability, Bald-
acchino also recalls Archer's chapter by ending with a case of 'norm entrepre-
neurship' at the UN, where European and non-European small states wielded
'soft power' together.
The lessons
As stressed above, the study of small states as we seek to use it is not a reduc-
tionist theory. It may be approached through and combined with any of the
dominant theories of International Relations (lR), from realism through to social
constructivism and beyond. It is at its best, however, when it is used to test such
theories through the exploration of outlying cases, and to challenge any over-
monolithic view of either statehood or the international system generally.
Preparing this volume has been an exercise both in enriching and in challeng-
ing the 'small state' concept itself. First and most obviously, when talking about
small states and security, the book's different sections show the complex nature
of - and the need for a critical approach to - both terms involved. Small states
themselves are just as diverse as any other constructed category in international
society. They overlap variously with other categories, such as developing and
developed; 'weak states' (in the twenty-first century sense); and well-governed
states - modem and post-modem. Where they stand along these three axes - plus
the axis of economic vulnerability, as discussed in Griffiths' chapter - provides
perhaps the best starting-point for assessing the character and manageability of
their security challenges.
Merely being small, or even very small, if a state enjoys external and internal
peace and wise governance, may be a factor that reduces rather than multiplies
security headaches. It eliminates the need to make a pretence of self-sufficient
defence or even to create military forces at all. It dampens expectations of a
significant outgoing contribution to global goods like peacekeeping and, rather,
creates a supposition of importing help in natural and accidental emergencies.
Such a state is arguably less 'state-like' than others in traditionallR terms, and
the micro-states covered in Chapter 10 are the most extreme and clear examples.
Add a modicum of flexibility and inventiveness to the mix, however, and small
actors may emerge - as shown by examples in Chapter 14 - as remarkably well-
attuned to the rules of survival both in today's and tomorrow's increasingly glo-
balized world.
When things go wrong in security terms, then like Tolstoy's unhappy fam-
ilies, there are almost as many variants of trouble as there are small states them-
selves. Parts II and 1II of this book bear out the contention in Part I that newer,
broader definitions of security, including non-state threats and economic and
functional dimensions, can better capture the full spectrum of small state chal-
lenees than the Dost-World War II realist discourse. with its purelv military and
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territorial focus. To be sure, geopolitical location continues to be of central
importance to small state security, but the case-studies in this volume illustrate
how many small states inside and outside Europe have a considerable action
space when deciding how to confront the challenges spurred by location and
power politics. Accordingly, within the four-way framework proposed in
Chapter 2, the small states covered in the geographical chapters emerge with
very diverse combinations of security priorities. Only a minority of those dis-
cussed, such as the Western Balkan states and Sri Lanka, have the consequences
of recent internal armed conflict near the top of their agendas, and this is in line
with the slowly decreasing frequency of such conflicts (or at least 'major' ones)
worldwide.' A larger number, from the Baltic States through to Singapore, are
coping with prominent or residual threats from bigger neighbours of dubious
intent. Just about all face economic challenges that call for constant effort and
inventiveness to stay afloat, whether at a higher or lower level of wealth and
development. All, to some degree, are open to issues of security of supply, trans-
national human challenges like crime, and natural ones like pollution and climate
change, and various kinds of civil emergencies. A final variant in the mix is the
perception, whether justified or not, of 'enemies within', which may be triggered
either by long.standing ethnic divisions, or by concern over being swamped and
culturally diluted by immigration.
To be of any use, this book's analysis cannot stop at documenting such issues
but needs to consider how small states can best grapple with them. It is here that
the 'relational' approach to small state identity, as proposed earlier in this intro-
ductory chapter, really proves its worth. Any small state in a region populated
mainly by states of similar and medium size (such as Europe, the Caribbean or
the Pacific) has different options from one whose only external relations - both
with potential problem states and protectors - are severely asymmetrical.
Further, both similarity and asymmetry vis-a-vis neighbours can make their mark
on national predicaments at several different levels of absolute size. The
common factors in the most problematic cases are quintessentially relational,
and often include subjective or constructed elements: lack of room for man-
oeuvre, de facto compromised sovereignty, but also a sense of smallness as help-
lessness and victimhood that, at worst, may lead the small actor itself into bad
choices. Hard though some may find it to accept, Chapter 9, on Georgia and
Moldova, correctly notes Georgia's own contribution to the circumstances that
triggered war with Russia in 2008. Critical observers might also see instances of
counter-productive, provocative behaviour in the recent story of the Baltic
States. Few could claim that all the small Western Balkan states, or Sri Lanka,
are free of all responsibility for their own sufferings.
This only takes us as far, however, as concluding that small states in asym-
metric situations mayor may not find improved solutions by means that include
their own wisdom and restraint. To explain more fully the differences reflected
in this volume's chapters, another factor should be brought into the picture: the
presence, absence and relative effectiveness of multilateral regional or sub-
regional organizations. Chapter 2 proposes the hypothesis that small states
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should have a better chance of moderating both their hard and soft security prob-
lems if one or more functional groupings of this kind are present. Such a thesis
is in line with recent directions in small state studies that explore the generic
relevance of institutions as 'shelters'- capable of supplementing or even sup-
planting the more traditional state-protector relationship (e.g. Bailes and Thorh-
allsson 2013). How far do the case-studies in Parts II and III of this volume bear
this theory out?
The European cases covered in Part II actually fit it well. The Nordic and
Baltic nations are all living with an asymmetric, historically threatening and still
ambiguous neighbour, namely Russia. All have, however, gained high or very
high levels of wellbeing and an almost complete immunity (by now) from
military or political domination, with no crushing societal or economic costs in
terms of their own militarization. First and foremost, this is thanks to their region
being covered for hard security purposes by NATO (and by the US through
NATO), and for economic and functional security purposes by the EU. However,
the way that the two sets of states have worked together among themselves has
also been an important and arguably essential part of the mix. By establishing
strong and ostensibly de-securitized, inter-Nordic ties during the Cold War, the
Nordic states have built a kind of security community that surmounts persistent
divisions in institutional status and takes aggression or damaging competition
among themselves out of the equation. More recently, overt Nordic security and
defence cooperation has begun to address sub-regional challenges (including
Arctic ones) in an efficient mode of subsidiarity and has enhanced relative
Nordic standing in the European policy game. The Baltic States would not have
gained EU and NATO entry so fast, nor have been able to exploit these institu-
tions' cover so well, had they not teamed up for local security purposes and also
drawn in Nordic advice and aid at crucial stages. These countries have added to
their security by enshrining their relations with Russia in regional multilateral
frameworks - the Barents Euro-Arctic Council and the Council for Baltic Sea
States - that allow an inclusive web of linkages to be established between all
neighbouring states and their societies.
The prospects of the Western Balkan states depend most obviously on their
integration into NATO and the EU, the only extant frameworks powerful enough
to overcome these states' recent mutual enmity and still-existing internal ethnic
divisions. Sub-regional processes in this part of Europe were initially - and
understandably in post-war conditions - designed from outside.' However, if one
goes through the motions long enough, even in imposed behaviours, they may
start to have a real transformative effect. Chapter 8 interestingly suggests that
not only have key local actors understood the need to 'show willing' in their
mutual relations for pragmatic purposes of accession strategy (hence the recent
Serbia-Kosovo agreement), but that cross-border and wider transnational flows
in the region are beginning to take positive effect both in concrete economic and
in attitudinal terms.
The situation of Moldova and Georgia makes an instructive contrast. Their
predicament can be put down first and foremost to 'location, location, location',
i'
r
-
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with Moldova being on the borderline of the EU's and NATO's present strategic
reach and Georgia fatally beyond it. The Russia that has grudgingly accepted the
Baltic States' full independence and Western integration is the same nation that
has managed to prise away parts of Moldovan and Georgian territory, and to
restrict (in practice) these states' strategic options. The presence or absence of
Western - including US - ability and will to challenge Russia's local dominance
is the most obvious variable in the two cases: but it is not the only one. The com-
plete failure of the independent states emerging from the Western part of the
former Soviet Union to create sub-regional groupings with real clout and mutual
loyalty' is also important, especially when contrasted with Nordic, Baltic or non-
European (to be covered shortly) examples. It bears out the relativistic slant of
the relational hypothesis by showing that a small state may be effectively alone
in handling a dominant neighbour, even when it has other neighbours of a similar
smallness. Finally, and also to be discussed further in Chapter 9, Moldova's and
Georgia's own weaknesses of governance and security management have aggra-
vated their exposure to hostile interference, just as they have impeded their pro-
gress towards Western integrated standards.
It may be tempting to dismiss this analysis as Euro-centric. In fact, the chapters
in Part III suggest that factoring in the element of regional and sub-regional organ-
ization does have a wider explanatory value, so long as variations in the local
concept of statehood - and hence of inter-state relations - are taken into account.
In Southeast Asia, for example, older traditions separate the strength and influence
of states from their objective size, while modem approaches to multilateral cooper-
ation eschew the internally intrusive imposition of standards that is central to EU-
style integration. Vet the availability of the sub-regional ASEAN network to a
small actor like Singapore, and larger frames like the ASEAN Regional Forum
(ARF), where balancing llIctics can be essayed towards Chilia, has played a real
part in minimizing and containing physical conflicts in the neighbouthood and in
creating conditions for non-zero-sum regional growth. Chapter 13, on the Carib-
bean, explores in detail how the transnational and post-modern nature of most
security challenges for that cluster of small states has drawn solutions based on
regional and global network-building in its wake. This chapter, together with
Chapter 14, rightly reminds us that just as the new security challenges are often of
non-state origin, so the equivalent of regional institution-building in the business,
NGO and civil society spheres can also be an important part of solutions - and one
where notions of small state weakness under realist analysis become less and less
relevant. To the extent that such approaches succeed, they reduce the need and
scope for outside powers' interference and divide-and-rule attempts, and thus rein-
force the need to rethink traditional realist logic if we are to understand the security
challenges and opportunities of small states.
What seems to need more study, and is just starting to be more deeply probed
in Europe, is the price that small states must pay for the multiple security bene-
fits of institutionalization. Aside from direct expenses and the impact of intrusive
standardization, serious burdens may be involved in shouldering the security
agendas of other, larger and/or more exposed integration partners, and in
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contributing to collective institutional interventions outside the home area. The
normative hazard of having to espouse partners' self-interested and possibly
aggressive policies is not wholly irrelevant here, though the risks are probably
less than when bandwaggoning with a single large protector, who may make
more arbitraryand extreme choices than an institution working by consensus.
Further, the intrusive regulatory impact of the more deep-reaching multilateral
structures may start to undermine national identity itself, in a way that traditional
empires often markedly failed to do. It would be good to see more work done on
investigating such benefit-eost equations of regionalization in non-European
cases, including Eurasian examples like the Russian-led groupings and the
Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Other areas not covered in this book, but
where interesting variations might be discovered, are the sub-regions Of Africa,
Central America, and the cluster of small Arab states in the Gulf.
This discussion may appropriately end where Chapter 2 also ends: by noting the
importance of internal security governance. No state, however small, is entirely
without free will in this matter. The smallest states can be just as divided, corrupt,
incoherent and inconsistent in forming and executing security strategies as any
large state; they may even fall more readily into such traps when they discount the
need for formal structures. Yet good internal governance, including intra-
governmental and cross-sectoral coordination and a minimum of democratic
control, makes a real difference to success in any environment and under any ana-
lytical framework. Realistically, this implies maximizing national strength and
leaving no cracks for hostile forces to exploit (a point interestingly explored in
Chapter 12). In a more post-modem envirorunent, where institutional shelters are
available, demonstrating good governance and 'interoperable' practices in this as
well as other spheres can make all the difference in the feasibility and speed of
integration, while at the same creating new challenges in the form of 'goodwill
competition' among small states vying for influence over institutional inclusion
and the attention of the great powers (Mouritzen and Wivel 2005b: 34-36).
As the Chapter 4, on 'societal' security will stress, this reasoning does not
imply that any single governance model or terminology - least of all a Euro-
centric one - should be imposed on all small states. It does mean that all of them
would do well to ask questions about their internal as well as external practices,
in the light of the analysis and empirical case-studies offered by this book.
Notes
'Should small states be categorized along geographic, demographic or economic lines,
or do institutions, resources, and power hold the key?' ask Smith et al. in a discussion
of small states (Smith et 01. 2005). Students of International Relations are unlikely to
deliver a uniform answer to this question, or even to agree on whether the question is
correctly posed for an understanding of the nature and challenges of small states.
2 Important contributions to the realist perspective on international relations include, for
example, Morgenthau (1948), Waltz (1979) and more recently Mearsheimer (2001).
For discussions on the contemporary state of realism, see Booth (2011) and Lobell et
01. (2009).
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3 'Micro-stat~s' in Europe. are commonly defined to include Andorra, Liechtenstein,
Monaco, San Marino and the Vatican City. See Chapter 10 in this volume.
4 Following Vliyrynen, Archer and Nugent suggest that we combine objective factors
such as 'size of diplomatic corps' and 'size of GDP' with subjective factors such as
'foreign governments" view of a state's size and capability' and 'domestic govern-
ments' , view of its own state's size and capability' (Archer and Nugent 2002: 2-3).
5 See also the discussions by Knudsen (1996: 5) and Gartner (1993: 303), which pre-
ceded the current development of the small state concept but introduced a similar crit-
ical approach to the power possession definition.
6 According to SIPRJ (the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute), state.to-
state conflicts in 2002-2011 averaged 33 per year compared with 53 in 1992. Cases of
'one-sided violence' halved in 2002-2011, while non-state conflicts initially halved
during that period but then returned to 38 per year (Themner and Wallensteen 2013:
52-57).
7 While the Western Balkans were covered by an earlier and larger Central European
Initiative, the first sub-region-specific framework - the Southeast European Coopera-
tion Initiative - was devised in 1996 under the guidance of the then Senior Director for
Eastern Europe in the United States National Security Council, Richard Schifler. Its
modem successor, the Regional Cooperation Council (RCC), is covered in Chapter 8
of this volume.
8 The problem has two levels. First, the states of the region are split as to their basic
strategic orientation: towards cooperation with Russia (Belarus, Armenia), or
towards the West and Turkey (Moldova, Georgia, Azerbaijan), with Ukraine often
oscillating in between. Second, both the GUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan,
Moldova Organization for Democracy and Economic Development) grouping aimed
at balancing Russia, and the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization
(CSTO), have severe institutional weaknesses including a failure to overcome the
basic bilateral dynamic in their respective members' relations with Moscow (Bailes
ef 01. 2007).
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